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by KAJ H O B E R * 
I. I N T R O D U C T I O N 
1 APRIL 1999 is an important date in the history of Swedish arbitration. On that 
date die new Swedish Arbitration Act (the Act) entered into force. On the same 
date, the new Rules of the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce (the SCC Rules) also took effect. After years of preparation, the 1929 
Swedish Arbitration Act and the 1929 Act Concerning Foreign Arbitration 
Agreements and Awards were replaced by the new Act. The SCC Rules have been 
prepared on the basis of, and taking account of, the Act. The Act and the Rules 
together constitute an efficient and comprehensive collection of arbitration 
provisions and rules relating to arbitrations in Sweden. 
Commercial arbitration has a long tradition in Sweden. It probably goes back to 
the fourteenth century. The first comprehensive Swedish Arbitration Act was not, 
however, adopted until 1887. It was replaced by the 1929 Arbitration Act. For 70 
years this Act provided a satisfactory legislative framework for commercial 
arbitration - both domestic and international - in Sweden. The explanation for 
mis state of affairs is in all likelihood the autonomy which the arbitral process has 
always enjoyed under Swedish law. Swedish courts have mosdy adhered to a policy 
of non-interference with arbitration. Arbitral awards are set aside only on narrowly 
defined procedural grounds, e.g. if the procedure violates the agreement of the 
parties or if it fails to meet minimum standards of due process. It has long been a 
well-established principle mat arbitral awards cannot be reviewed or retried on the 
merits. The underlying philosophy is, and has always been, that of freedom of 
contract, trust in the arbitrators and recognition of the advantages of a single, 
privately administered dispute settlement mechanism. The Act is also permeated 
by mis philosophy. 
As a result of increased commercial activity both in Sweden and internationally 
over the past decades and of the subsequent increase in the number of arbitrations 
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resulting from such activity, it was felt that the time had come to revise Swedish 
arbitration legislation. In 1992, at the suggestion of the SCC Institute, the Swedish 
Government issued instructions for the preparation of a new Arbitration Act and 
appointed a committee of experts to prepare a draft Act. 
The report of the committee of experts, including a draft new Arbitration Act, 
was published in June 1994. In accordance with Swedish practice, the Ministry of 
Justice referred the report for comments to a number of Swedish authorities, courts, 
bodies and associations which were asked to provide comments in writing. The SCC 
Institute, in cooperation with the Ministry, distributed an English summary of the 
report to a number of foreign experts soliciting their views on the draft Arbitration 
Act. Subsequent to the review by the Ministry of Justice of the draft Arbitration Act, 
a Parliamentary Bill was introduced in 1998. The Act was adopted by Parliament on 
4 March 1999 and, as stated supra, entered into force on 1 April 1999. 
The Act, which, as mentioned above, replaces both the 1929 Arbitration 
Act and the 1929 Act Concerning Foreign Arbitration Agreements and Awards, is 
still based on the 1929 legislation, but adapts and improves on the older legislation 
by incorporating principles from practice and case law. The Act also takes account 
of developments in international arbitration, notably the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration. The Act, like the previous one, applies 
equally to domestic and international arbitrations, but nevertheless conforms 
closely to the Model Law. 
By way of introduction, I shall briefly summarise some of the more important 
changes introduced by the Act. 
(a) The Arbitration Agreement 
Section 48 contains an important and new rule relating to the law governing the 
arbitration agreements proper - i.e. as distinct from the commercial contract in 
which the arbitration agreement is included - which have an international 
connection. Section 48 provides that, unless the parties have chosen the applicable 
law, the arbitration agreement is governed by the law of the country in which the 
proceedings have taken place, or are to take place, in accordance with the 
arbitration agreement. 
(b) Arbitrability 
The Act is based on the same fundamental definition of arbitrability as the 
previous Act, i.e. that any dispute in respect of which the parties are entitled to 
conclude a settlement is arbitrable. 
Section 1 of the Act does, however, set out new provisions which widen die 
power of arbitral tribunals beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. First, it stipulates 
that a dispute concerning the mere existence of a particular fact is arbitrable. 
Secondly, section 1 provides that arbitrators may fill gaps in contracts. Finally, a 
new statutory provision is included in the last sentence of section 1, to the effect 
that arbitrators are entitled to rule on the effects as between die parties of 
competition laws. 
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(c) Separability 
The separability of an arbitration agreement from the commercial contract - a 
principle which has long been accepted in Swedish arbitration law - has found its 
statutory confirmation in the first paragraph of section 3. 
The logical and necessary concomitant of the separability doctrine - the 
doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz - is enshrined in section 2 of the Act. This 
doctrine, which allows an arbitral tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction whenever 
the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement is challenged, was developed 
in case law before being included in the new legislation. 
(d) The Procedure 
The Act introduces new rules in section 23 with respect to amendments of claims 
and the admissibility of counterclaims. As a result, the respondent may introduce 
its own prayer for relief, provided it is covered by the arbitration agreement and 
provided it is not deemed inappropriate to accept it for consideration, having 
regard to the point of time at which it is introduced or to other circumstances. In 
the course of the proceedings, each party may, on the same conditions, amend or 
supplement prayers for relief introduced at an earlier stage and rely on new 
circumstances in support of its case. 
(e) Decisions and Awards 
The Act endows the arbitrators with a wide discretion to issue separate awards, 
eliminating the need for approval by both parties. The Act also introduces a right 
for the respondent to have the dispute resolved, even if the claimant withdraws its 
claim. Section 28 of the Act stipulates that if a party withdraws a prayer for relief, 
the arbitrators shall dismiss that part of the dispute, unless the other party requests 
the arbitrators to rule on the prayer for relief. 
Under the previous Act, arbitrators made decisions by majority vote. This rule 
has now been abandoned. Section 30, paragraph 2, of the Act, stipulates that, 
unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the opinion shared by the majority of the 
arbitrators participating in the deliberations shall prevail, but that the chairman 
shall decide if no majority is attained. 
Section 30, paragraph 1, introduces yet another new provision preventing an 
arbitrator from obstructing the proceedings by failing to attend deliberations of the 
tribunal. 
(f) Interim Security Measures 
The Act includes a new provision on interim security measures of protection. 
Section 25, paragraph 4, provides that unless the parties have agreed otherwise, 
the arbitrators may, at the request of a party, decide that the other party must take 
certain measures during the course of the proceedings to secure the claim. 
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(g) Invalidity, Setting Aside and Remission of Awards; Exclusion Agreements 
The procedural grounds on the basis of which an arbitral award may be challenged 
remain by and large the same. These provisions are exhaustive, such that arbitral 
awards cannot be attacked on any grounds other than diose enumerated in the 
relevant provisions. Some of the grounds have been slightly amended with a view 
to adapting the statutory language to that of the relevant provisions in the 
UNCITRAL Model Law. A new feature of the Act is a provision allowing non-
Swedish parties to enter into exclusion agreements by which they waive in advance, 
wholly or partially, the applicability of the grounds for setting aside an award 
enumerated in section 34 of the Act. 
(h) The SCC Rules 
As mentioned supra, the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce has adopted new arbitration rules, the SCC Rules, which also entered 
into effect on 1 April 1999. 
The SCC Rules, like the Act, apply equally to domestic and international 
arbitrations. The Rules may also be applied in arbitrations outside Sweden. 
The previous SCC Rules were adopted in 1988. The changes and amendments 
in me new SCC Rules are therefore relatively few. Most of them have been 
introduced as a consequence of the Act. A number of new provisions are 
nevertheless worthy of note. They are highlighted below. 
The most important change are the new rules on arbitration costs. They signify 
an important change of principle. Under the 1988 SCC Rules, the arbitrators 
determined their own fees. Their decision was based mainly on the time spent on 
the case, although the Rules also suggested mat the complexity of the case, the 
amount in dispute and other circumstances were to be taken into account. 
Under the SCC Rules, the arbitrators' fees are fixed by the SCC Institute based 
on me amount in dispute. This is the procedure most commonly used among 
international arbitration institutions. The main advantage of such a system is that it 
enables parties to calculate and predict the costs of arbitration more accurately. 
Another important new provision deals with the applicable substantive law. 
Article 24 of the SCC Rules confirms current practice with regard to applicable 
law, i.e. that the greatest possible freedom is given to the parties to choose the law 
applicable to their contract. The provision makes clear that the parties may agree 
not only on any national law, but also on any principles of law, and that they may 
empower the arbitral tribunal to act as amiable compositeur or ex aequo et bono. 
In practice, however, parties often fail to agree on die applicable law. In such 
cases article 24 empowers die arbitral tribunal to apply die law, or principles of 
law, it deems most appropriate, without having resort to any conflict of laws rules. 
Under die SCC Rules, diree arbitrators are appointed unless otherwise agreed 
by the parties. Each party appoints one arbitrator and die SCC Institute a diird, to 
act as chairman of the arbitral tribunal. The parties may, however, agree on a 
method for appointing die third arbitrator odier than appointment by the SCC 
Institute. 
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Moreover, article 16:1 of the SCC Rules now empowers the SCC Institute, 
unless the parties have specified the number of arbitrators, to decide that the 
dispute be settled by a sole arbitrator. In making such a decision the Institute is to 
take into account, inter alia, the complexity of the case and the amount in dispute. 
The time for rendering the award has been reduced considerably and is now six 
months instead of one year, as under the previous SCC Rules. 
In the following I shall briefly comment on the Act and the SCC Rules, focusing 
on the new provisions, under the following headings: 
• the arbitration agreement; 
• the arbitrators; 
• the procedure; 
• the award; and 
• the finality and enforceability of awards. 
While the focus will be on the new provisions, it will occasionally be necessary to 
provide background and general information going beyond the new provisions. 
I I . T H E A R B I T R A T I O N A G R E E M E N T 
(a) Applicable Law 
As mentioned supra, one of the new provisions in the Act is section 48, which for 
the first time introduces a choice of law rule with respect to the arbitration 
agreement proper. Section 48 clearly proceeds on the assumption that the 
arbitration agreement is independent and separate from the contract into which it 
has been incorporated and therefore not automatically governed by the same law 
as the commercial contract. 
In the old legislation, the 1929 Act Concerning Foreign Arbitration Agreements 
and Arbitral Awards - implementing the provisions of the New York Convention 
- there were provisions dealing with the law applicable to the arbitration 
agreement, but only in situations when enforcement of a foreign award was sought. 
There were no provisions addressing the question of applicable law in general, and 
prior to the rendering of an award. That is why it was deemed desirable to 
introduce a more general provision on the law applicable to the arbitration 
agreement. 
The starting point in section 48 is party autonomy. Consequently, if the parties 
have chosen a law to be applied to the arbitration agreement, such choice of law will 
be honoured. It is probably very unusual, however, that parties make a separate 
choice of law with respect to the arbitration agreement. Section 48 goes on to say 
that, if no choice of law has been made by the parties, the arbitration agreement will 
be governed by the law of the country in which the arbitration has taken place as a 
result of the agreement of the parties, or if no proceedings have yet taken place, 
where they are to take place pursuant to the agreement of the parties. This 
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corresponds to the approach taken in Article V of the New York. Convention, 
where the place of arbitration plays a decisive role. It thus follows from section 48 
that if the parties have agreed on the place of arbitration in their arbitration clause, 
the law of that country will be applied to determine the validity of the arbitration 
agreement and to interpret it. If no place of arbitration has been agreed, but the 
arbitration agreement empowers the arbitrators, or an arbitration institution, to make 
the choice, the law of the place of arbitration so chosen will be applied. In situations 
when not even this is the case, and no proceedings have in fact taken place, recourse 
must be had to the general rules and principles of - arguably - Swedish conflict of 
laws rules, the ultimate purpose of which is to determine the will of the parties in this 
respect. One aspect to take into consideration in such a situation is whether the 
commercial contract has a governing law clause. If this is the case, it would seem 
reasonable to assume, as a general rule, that the parties have intended the law so 
chosen to apply to the arbitration clause as well. This can only be an assumption, 
however. If other circumstances point to another law, such circumstances must be 
taken into consideration. 
For practical purposes, section 48 means that when arbitrations take place in 
Sweden, Swedish law will usually be applied to the arbitration agreement, unless 
the parties have chosen another law to be applied to it. 
If an arbitration takes place in Sweden pursuant to an arbitration agreement 
which is governed by foreign law as a result of the parties' choice of law, such 
foreign law will govern the agreement as explained supra. It is important to note, 
however, that in one respect Swedish law will nevertheless play a decisive role, i.e. 
as regards the effect of an arbitration agreement as a bar to court proceedings. 
It follows from section 49 of the Act, read together with section 4 of the Act, to 
which reference is made in section 49, that to bar a court of law from taking 
jurisdiction over a dispute, the arbitration agreement in question must be valid 
pursuant to the (foreign) law applicable to it and the issue(s) in question must also 
be arbitrable under Swedish law. The reason for this double requirement is that an 
award rendered in Sweden dealing with an issue which is not arbitrable under 
Swedish law is invalid pursuant to section 33 of the Act. 
(b) Arbitrability 
The Act confirms the conceptual definition of arbitrability found in the old Act, 
i.e. that any dispute in respect of which the parties may reach a settlement by 
agreement is arbitrable. In comparison with the old Act, however, section 1 of the 
Act has introduced a number of provisions which enlarge the scope of 
arbitrability. 
First, in the first paragraph of section 1, third sentence, it is explicitly stated that 
the dispute may concern the mere existence, or non-existence, of a particular fact. 
In so doing the Act removes the uncertainty which prevailed under the old Act in 
this respect. To be arbitrable the fact in question does not need to be related to 
any legal consequences, even though this would typically be the situation in 
practice. 
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Secondly, the second paragraph of section 1 explicitly states that arbitrators may 
interpret and fill gaps in contracts. 
This would be relevant mosdy in long-term contracts, e.g. concerning industrial 
cooperation and supply of natural resources and raw materials. While this is a 
welcome clarification, it is doubtful ffiat the provision adds very much to the 
already existing powers of the arbitrators. It would seem that interpretation of and 
gap-filling with respect to contracts form part of the customary methods of 
interpretation of contracts and as such would normally be covered anyway by the 
arbitration agreement in question. It should be pointed out in this connection that 
while arbitrators have the right to fill gaps in contracts, they can exercise such a 
right only within the limits set by the parties. Consequendy, the arbitrators may 
not, e.g. rule ultra petita. 
Thirdly, a new important provision is found in die third paragraph of section 1, 
where it is said that the arbitrators may rule on the civil law effects of competition 
laws as between the parties. In Sweden, as in many otiier jurisdictions, it has been 
debated whether and to what extent anti-trust issues are arbitrable. The clear 
position taken by the Swedish legislator in the Act is that such issues are arbitrable, 
in so far as the relationship between the parties to the dispute is concerned. It is 
thus important to remember that the relevant anti-trust authorities retain 
jurisdiction over anti-trust issues which are not inter partes, but which involve 
the public interest. It must also be noted that while anti-trust issues are arbitrable, 
the arbitrators have neither the right nor the duty to apply relevant anti-trust 
legislation ex officio, but are dependent on such issues being raised by either of 
the parties. 
(c) Separability and Kompetenz-Kompetenz 
The doctrine of separability is a well-established principle of Swedish arbitration 
law. It has now for the first time found its statutory expression in section 3 of the 
Act. This section stipulates mat when ruling on the validity of an arbitration 
agreement - which forms part of another agreement, usually a commercial 
contract - in conjunction with determining the jurisdiction of the arbitrators, the 
arbitration agreement shall constitute a separate agreement. It is worth noting that 
the doctrine of separability applies also if an agreement, i.e. the commercial 
contract in question, is void ab initio. In practice the same factual circumstances 
will often surround both the arbitration agreement and the commercial contract. 
In such situations the arbitration agreement may also be invalid, not as a result of 
me fact that the commercial contract is invalid ab initio, however, but because the 
same factual circumstances apply to the arbitration agreement as well. 
The German doctrine of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, which is recognised in 
Article 16(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law, is now expressly enshrined in 
section 2, paragraph 1, of the Act. In short this doctrine empowers arbitrators to 
rule on uieir own jurisdiction whenever die existence or validity of the arbitration 
agreement is challenged. Section 2 provides that the arbitrators may rule on their 
own jurisdiction to decide the dispute, but that this does not prevent a court of law 
358 Arbitration International Volume 17 Number 4 
from ruling on such an issue at the request of a party. It also provides that the 
arbitrators may continue the arbitral proceedings pending the determination by 
the court. It is thus up to the arbitrators to decide - at the request of either party -
whether to stay the arbitral proceedings awaiting the decision of the court. Once a 
court of law has rendered a decision on the validity of the arbitration agreement, 
such decision is binding on arbitrators and parties alike. Consequently, by 
proceeding wiui the arbitration, the arbitrators do take a certain risk, i.e. that time 
and money will have been spent in vain, if a court of law rules that the arbitration 
agreement is invalid or inapplicable. 
The second paragraph of section 2 stipulates that if the arbitrators have decided 
during the proceedings that they have jurisdiction, such a decision is not binding. It 
is important to note that such a conclusion of the arbitrators is expressed in the 
form of a decision, rather than in an award. Such a decision is not final and 
binding either on the parties or on the arbitrators. If other circumstances come to 
light during the proceedings which cause the arbitrators to revise their previous 
decision on jurisdiction, they are free to do so. The fact that a decision on 
jurisdiction is not final and binding also means that there is no need for a party to 
initiate a court action with respect to the decision with the view to preserving its 
right to challenge the resulting arbitral award. The party concerned will have that 
right anyway. On the other hand, it must be noted that if the party in question 
continues to participate in the proceedings without protesting, it may be deemed to 
have waived its objection. 
If the arbitrators conclude that they do not have jurisdiction such conclusion 
will be expressed in an arbitral award. Such an award may be appealed to the 
competent Court of Appeal within three months pursuant to the provisions of 
section 36. This means that a party is entitled to attack an award by which 
arbitrators have decided that they do not have jurisdiction based on the conclusion 
that the dispute falls outside the scope of a valid arbitration agreement, or is not 
arbitrable, but that a party must do so within three months of receipt of the award. 
Conversely, as stated above, arbitrators who consider that they have jurisdiction 
are at liberty to so rule during the proceedings by way of a decision. Such a 
decision may be reversed or amended by the arbitrators. A party who is dissatisfied 
with such a decision can either institute a court action during the continued arbitral 
proceedings or await the final award which embodies the decision and challenge 
the award within three months. In the latter case the party must, however, as 
already mentioned, file a protest with the arbitrators to avoid the conclusion that it 
has waived its objection, and to avoid the preclusion which follows from the 
second paragraph of section 34 of the Act. 
(d) The Effect of die Arbitration Agreement 
The most important effect of a valid arbitration agreement - indeed a cornerstone 
in any modern system of commercial arbitration - is that it serves as a bar to court 
proceedings. This has long been recognised in Swedish law, but has not found any 
direct statutory expression. Section 4 of the Act remedies mis situation. This 
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section stipulates that a court may not, over an objection of a party, rule on an issue 
which 'pursuant to an arbitration agreement, shall be decided by arbitrators'. It is 
important to note not only that an objection to the jurisdiction of the court must be 
made by a party, but also that such objection must be made 'on the first occasion 
that a party states his case on the merits in the court'. If a party fails to make such 
objection, it becomes ineffective unless the party had a valid reason for not making 
the objection and subsequently made it as soon as that reason ceased to exist. Also, 
the arbitration agreement does not prevent a party from requesting decisions by a 
court of law concerning security measures with respect to claims under 
consideration by the arbitral tribunal. 
Section 4 of the Act must be read in conjunction with section 5 of the Act 
which sets out situations when an arbitration agreement does not bar court 
proceedings. 
Pursuant to section 5, a party may lose its right to rely on the arbitration 
agreement if it has: 
• disputed a request for arbitration by the other party; 
• failed to appoint its arbitrator in time; or 
• failed to pay its share of die requested security for compensation to the 
arbitrators. 
The above circumstances could be characterised as breaches of the arbitration 
agreement, sufficiently serious to allow the other party to treat the agreement as 
terminated. Generally speaking, there could be - and probably are - other 
material breaches of the arbitration agreement which would entitle the other party 
to terminate the agreement. The Act is, however, silent on this point. Even if the 
cases mentioned in section 5 may not be exhaustive, it is probably difficult to 
succeed in terminating the arbitration agreement on grounds which are not 
specifically mentioned in section 5, and which do not relate to general grounds for 
the invalidity of contracts such as fraud, duress etc. 
(e) Arbitration Agreements and Third Parties 
Whether and to what extent an arbitration agreement is binding on a third party is 
a controversial issue, given the natural starting point that an agreement can only 
bind the parties to it. In the report prepared by the committee of experts an 
attempt was made to resolve the various issues involved in this connection. The 
attempt was made against the background of several requests from interested 
organisations and bodies, as well as from practising lawyers. When the Ministry of 
Justice presented its Bill to Parliament, the proposal had been deleted. One 
reason was the sheer complexity of the issues, in die sense that mere is such a 
multitude of possible factual situations so as to make comprehensive legislation 
practically impossible. The proposal had also met severe criticism from many 
quarters. Another reason was that by the time the Government Bill was under 
preparation, the Supreme Court had rendered a decision which addressed several 
of me issues in question, thereby providing some guidance concerning assignment 
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of contracts. As a result of these developments, the Act does not have any 
provisions on party substitution,, no/ otherwise on the effect on third parties of the 
arbitration agreement. 
Starting with party substitution in the form of universal succession (death, 
bankruptcy, merger, reorganisation etc.), the generally held view is that the universal 
successor is bound by the arbitration clause, as is the remaining party to the contract. 
As far as singular succession is concerned, guidance is now provided by the 
aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court. In short the facts were as follows: 
in a shipbuilding contract a Dutch shipyard, Scheepswerf Ferus Smit BV (Ferus), 
undertook to build a ship, which was later called MS Emja. Subsequently, a 
German shipping company, Emja, acquired the rights and obligations in relation to 
Ferus under the shipbuilding contract. Ferus retained another shipyard, 
Scheepswerf Bijlsma BV (Bijlsma), as sub-contractor to build the ship. In a 
written contract with Bijlsma, Wartsila undertook to deliver a diesel engine to MS 
Emja. This contract referred pardy to the standard agreement ECE 188, including 
a supplement entitled 'Marine Equipment Addendum 1987', and partly, with 
regard to technical personnel, to the standard agreement T P 73 E. Both ECE 188 
and TP 73 E contained arbitration clauses. Both clauses stipulated that Swedish 
law be applied. Subsequent to delivery of MS Emja to the shipping company, 
there were problems with the diesel engine. To make it possible for Emja to 
commence proceedings against Wartsila, Ferus and Bijlsma transferred the title to 
the engine to Emja. On the basis of this transfer agreement, Emja commenced an 
action against Wartsila in a local court concerning the defective engine. The issue 
was whether the arbitration clauses in ECE 188 and T P 73 E, which constituted 
part of the agreement between Bijlsma and Wartsila, were binding on Emja. 
The Supreme Court, as well as the lower courts, accepted Wartsila's 
jurisdictional objection and concluded that Emja - as well as the original party -
was bound by the arbitration clause. The Supreme Court also discussed, albeit 
obiter dicta, whether the remaining party continues to be bound by the arbitration 
clause in case of singular succession on the other side. The court concluded that 
on balance the arguments in favour of letting the remaining party continue to be 
bound, dominate. It added, however, that the conclusion may be different when 
'special circumstances' apply. It is possible - although the Supreme Court was 
silent on this point - that such 'special circumstances' may include a situation 
where an assignment could be detrimental to the remaining party, e.g. because the 
new party lacks financial means. 
For the same reasons that the Ministry of Justice did not include in its Bill any 
proposal as to party substitution, it decided not to propose any provision with 
respect to guarantees and guarantee agreements. The extent to which a guarantor 
is bound by, or may rely on, an arbitration clause included in a contractual 
document separate from the guarantee therefore remains an open question. It is 
possible that guidance may still be derived from several old Supreme Court cases. 
It should be noted, however, that all three cases address only the situation when 
the guarantor relies on the arbitration clause as a bar to court proceedings, which 
the guarantor successfully did in all these cases. 
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An issue which is closely related to the effect of the arbitration agreement on 
third parties is that of multi-party arbitration. Many attempts have been made over 
the years, by scholars, practitioners and arbitral institutions alike, to find the magic 
formula to resolve the problems resulting from multi-party arbitration. Despite 
heroic efforts, they have generally not been crowned with success. The reason is 
simply that multi-party arbitrations can take very many different forms and, almost 
without exception, create complicated legal situations. 
The Act does not contain provisions dealing with multi-party arbitrations. As far 
as Swedish law is concerned, any solution in this respect must be sought on the 
basis of the fundamental principle of arbitration, i.e. freedom of contract, the will 
of the parties, or put differendy: the initiative must always rest with the parties. One 
of me problems in multi-party arbitrations is the appointment of arbitrators. In 
multi-party contracts it is not unusual that the parties agree mat the appointment of 
all, or some, arbitrators is to be made by an arbitral institution or by a court of law. 
With a view to facilitating the use of Swedish courts in diis respect, the Act 
stipulates in section 12 that the relevant district court shall appoint arbitrators, at 
the request of one of the parties provided that the parties have so agreed, in 
additional situations to that where the court steps in and appoints an arbitrator for 
a party, or where two party-appointed arbitrators fail to agree on a chairman. 
Also the SCC Rules have provisions intended to facilitate the appointment of 
arbitrators in a multi-party arbitration. The relevant provision is article 16:3 of the 
SCC Rules which stipulates that if multiple claimants or respondents cannot jointly 
agree on an arbitrator, the Arbitration Institute may appoint the arbitrator, or if 
special circumstance apply, all the arbitrators, unless the parties have agreed 
otherwise. 
I I I . T H E A R B I T R A T O R S 
(a) General 
The provisions in the Act dealing with the arbitrators and their appointment are to 
a large extent similar to those found in die old Act. Some provisions are new, 
however, and the language as well as the arrangement of the provisions have been 
modernised. 
The starting point is section 7 of the Act which stipulates that any person, 
having full legal capacity, may be appointed arbitrator. There are no restrictions 
with respect to nationality, education, profession etc. The only requirement is that 
an arbitrator be impartial as stipulated in section 8. This requirement applies 
equally to party-appointed arbitrators and other arbitrators. The concept of 'non-
neutral' arbitrators is unknown in Swedish law. 
Section 8 reads: 
At the request of a party, an arbitrator shall be discharged if there exists any circumstance which 
may diminish confidence in the arbitrator's impartiality. Such a circumstance shall always be 
deemed to exist: 
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1. where the arbitrator or a person closely associated with him is a party, or otherwise may 
expect considerable benefit or detriment, as a result of the outcome of the dispute; 
2. where the arbitrator or a person closely associated with him is the director of a company or 
any other association which is a party, or otherwise represents a party or any other person 
who may expect considerable benefit or detriment as a result of die outcome of the dispute; 
3. where the arbitrator has taken a position in the dispute, as an expert or otherwise, or has 
assisted a party in the preparation or conduct of his case in the dispute; or 
4. where the arbitrator has received or demanded compensation in violation of section 39, 
second paragraph. 
The rule laid down in section 8 refers to circumstances which may diminish 
confidence in an arbitrator's impartiality. It corresponds to article 12 of the Model 
Law. 
The first two paragraphs of section 8, and to some extent the third, mention 
situations where there is not only a lack of impartiality, but also doubt as to the 
arbitrator's independence. In the Act, independence is not mentioned explicitly, 
but is included in the concept of impartiality. Thus, the scope of impartiality (and 
independence) under the Act is no different from the scope of impartiality and 
independence under the Model Law. 
Article 17 of the SCC Rules also requires that an arbitrator be impartial and 
independent. Even though the language is different, there is no reason to believe 
that the interpretation of the SCC Rules in this respect will be different from that 
of the Act. 
With respect to item 3 in section 8 of the Act, the intention is to cover cases 
where the arbitrator has been actively involved in the dispute in some capacity. It is 
not the idea, however, to include cases where, e.g. a scholar has written a book or 
an article, in which he has taken a position in abstracto with respect to a legal or 
technical question which is relevant to the dispute. 
In the old Act there was no provision imposing a disclosure obligation on 
arbitrators. Provisions to this effect had, however, been introduced in the SCC 
Rules as in the rules of many other arbitration institutions. Such an obligation is 
now included in section 9 of the Act. It requires a person, who is asked to accept 
an appointment as arbitrator, to disclose immediately all circumstances which 
might cause him to be regarded as incapacitated or not impartial. He must inform 
the parties of such circumstances, as well as the other arbitrators, when all 
arbitrators have been appointed. This is a continuing obligation and thus requires 
him to make such disclosure throughout the course of the proceedings, as soon 
as he learns of any new circumstances that may cause him to lose his impartiality. 
Article 17 of the SCC Rules sets out similar requirements. 
(b) Appointment of Arbitrators 
Under section 12 of the Act, the parties may determine the number of arbitrators 
and the manner in which they are to be appointed. If the parties have not agreed 
on the appointment of arbitrators, the Act provides supplementary provisions in 
this respect. 
Section 13 of the Act stipulates that when the parties have not agreed otherwise, 
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the number of arbitrators shall be three. Each party shall appoint one arbitrator, 
and these two arbitrators shall choose the third arbitrator. Pursuant to section 20 
of the Act, unless the parties have agreed otherwise, the chairman shall be the 
arbitrator appointed by die other arbitrators, or by the district court. 
The parties may also agree on a sole arbitrator or, e.g. if the dispute is among 
several parties, on five arbitrators or more. There is no provision in die Act 
requiring an uneven number of arbitrators. 
The respondent must, within 30 days of having received notification of the 
claimant's choice of arbitrator, notify the claimant of its choice. According to 
section 14 of the Act this rule is limited to cases where the claimant has notified 
the respondent of its choice of arbitrator in die request for arbitration. If die 
respondent does not appoint an arbitrator within the stipulated time, die claimant 
may ask the district court to make die appointment. When a party has appointed 
an arbitrator and notified the other party of the appointment, such appointment 
may be revoked only with the approval of the other party. 
Under section 15 of the Act, the assistance of the district court may be 
requested by a party also in other situations, e.g. where two arbitrators are to 
appoint die diird arbitrator, but fail to do so within 30 days of the appointment of 
the last arbitrator, and when the parries are joindy to appoint the third arbitrator, 
or where that appointment must be made by a third party, and the parties or the 
third party fail to do so within 30 days. 
According to section 18 of the Act, a court of law has the duty to take decisions 
in the situations described above, and may refuse to do so only if it is manifest that 
arbitration cannot be held, e.g. because the issues in dispute are not arbitrable, or 
it is evident that there is no binding arbitration agreement. 
Article 16 of the SCC Rules provides that where die parties have not agreed 
otherwise, the arbitral tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators. However, taking 
the complexity and die value of the dispute and all otiier circumstances into 
consideration, the SCC Institute may decide that there be only one arbitrator, who 
is to be appointed by the SCC Institute. Where there is to be more than one 
arbitrator, each party is to appoint an equal number of arbitrators. If a party does 
not appoint the arbitrator(s), he/they are appointed by the SCC Institute, which 
also appoints the chairman, unless the parties have agreed otherwise. If the parties 
are of different nationalities, the sole arbitrator, or the chairman, must have a 
different nationality, unless the parties agree otherwise, or special circumstances 
dictate it. As mentioned above, article 16:3 of the SCC Rules set out provisions for 
the appointment of arbitrators in multi-party disputes. 
(c) Disqualification of Arbitrators 
Under section 10 of the Act, an arbitrator may be challenged because of lack of 
impartiality, and under section 17 if he has delayed die proceedings. As 
mentioned supra, section 8 of the Act enumerates in a non-exhaustive way a 
number of cases, where such circumstances which may diminish me confidence in 
an arbitrator's impartiality are deemed to exist. 
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Under section 17 of the Act, a challenge to an arbitrator may take place at 
either party's request, if the arbitrator has delayed die proceedings. This is a 
sanction arising from die duty prescribed in section 21 of the Act, to the effect that 
the arbitrators shall handle the dispute in an impartial, practical and speedy 
manner. It is not stated explicidy, but the delay referred to in section 17 must be 
material or occur repeatedly. 
Section 10 of die Act provides that a challenge to an arbitrator based on lack of 
impartiality must be presented within 15 days from the date on which the party 
bringing the motion became aware bodi of die appointment of the arbitrator and 
of the existence of the circumstance allegedly causing his lack of impartiality. This 
means that no time limit begins to run until after appointment of the arbitrator. If a 
party is aware of a reason for challenging an arbitrator prior to his appointment, 
that party must submit the challenge within 15 days from the appointment. If the 
party becomes aware of the ground for challenge only after the appointment, the 
15 day period starts to run from the date when it became aware diereof. 
If a challenge is presented, it will be decided by the (other) arbitrators unless the 
parties have agreed otherwise. If die arbitrators grant the challenge, their decision 
is final and cannot be appealed to die ordinary courts. If the arbitrators do nor 
grant the challenge, section 10 distinguishes between cases where die ground for 
refusal is that the challenge was filed too late, and other cases. If it was filed too 
late, the decision may be appealed to die district court within 30 days. No mention 
is made in the Act of the otiier cases. In all likelihood, diis means that the decision 
of die district court is final. 
As mentioned supra, die parties may agree that decisions regarding challenges 
to arbitrators be decided by someone other than the arbitrators, e.g. by an 
arbitration institution. In diat case, the decision of such institution will be final and 
cannot be appealed or otherwise brought before the ordinary courts. 
Pursuant to section 10 of the Act, the fact diat a decision witii respect to a 
challenge is appealed to die district court does not necessarily mean diat the 
arbitration proceedings must be stayed. It is in the discretion of die arbitrators to 
decide whether to stay die proceedings or not; they may even render an award, 
while court proceedings are pending. 
Where removal is sought on the basis of section 17 of the Act, because an 
arbitrator is delaying die proceedings, die decision is taken by the district court 
without appeal to a higher court. If the court or institution removes the arbitrator, 
it is to appoint another arbitrator. 
In other cases, where an arbitrator resigns or is removed, and where die parties 
have not provided otherwise, section 16 of the Act provides diat a new arbitrator 
shall, at the request of a party, be appointed by the district court. If, on the other 
hand, die arbitrator is prevented from fulfilling his duties as an arbitrator, due to 
circumstances which arose subsequent to his appointment, the person, who 
originally had the right to appoint an arbitrator must also make die new 
appointment. The rules regulating the original appointment also apply to 
tiiis appointment. 
The SCC Rules also contain provisions on the disqualification of arbitrators. 
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Article 18 of the SCC Rules stipulates that where a party wishes to challenge an 
arbitrator for lack of impartiality, he must submit the challenge to the SCC 
Institute in writing and give reasons for the challenge. Such submission must be 
made within 15 days from the date when the party became aware of the 
circumstances on which the challenge is based. When the SCC Institute receives a 
challenge, it must give the parties and the arbitrators an opportunity to comment 
on the challenge. Thereafter, the SCC Institute decides the matter, and, if it finds 
the challenge justified, removes the arbitrator. This decision is not subject to 
appeal. 
The SCC Institute may, however, also remove an arbitrator without a challenge, 
i.e. on the basis of article 19 of the SCC Rules, if the arbitrator becomes unable to 
fulfil his function, or the SCC Institute finds that he does not fulfil his duties. 
Before doing so the SCC Institute must give the parties and the arbitrators an 
opportunity to express their views. 
When an arbitrator resigns or is removed, the SCC Institute appoints another 
arbitrator. This applies regardless of who originally appointed the arbitrator, who 
has resigned or who has been removed. If he was appointed by a party, mat party 
must be given an opportunity to present its comments. If the arbitral tribunal 
consists of three or more arbitrators, the SCC Institute may, after having heard the 
parties and the arbitrators, decide not to appoint a replacement, but leave it to the 
remaining arbitrators to continue the proceedings, thus concluding the arbitration 
with only two arbitrators. In practice, however, this situation occurs very rarely. 
Should an arbitrator die in office, the party who appointed him must appoint a 
new arbitrator, or the SCC Institute, if the arbitrator had been appointed by it in 
the first place. 
(d) Compensation of Arbitrators 
Pursuant to section 37 of the Act, the arbitrators are entided to reasonable 
compensation for their work and for expenses incurred. It is important to note mat 
the parties are joindy and severally liable for payment of the compensation to the 
arbitrators. However, if fhe arbitrators find mat they do not have jurisdiction to try 
a case, the party objecting to their jurisdiction is liable for the compensation to the 
arbitrators only in exceptional circumstances. Reasonable compensation must be 
determined in relation to the time spent on the case, the complexity of the case, 
and odier relevant circumstances. 
The arbitrators may agree with the parties on meir compensation, but only with 
bom parties togemer. An agreement with only one party is void pursuant to 
section 39, paragraph 2, of the Act. 
Section 40 of die Act reiterates a traditional rule of Swedish arbitration law 
expressed also in the old Act, i.e. mat the arbitrators may not withhold the award 
to obtain payment for their costs or fees. However, section 38 provides mat the 
arbitrators may request security for their costs and fees. Interest on the security is 
included therein. The arbitrators may fix separate security amounts for certain 
claims, e.g. for counterclaims or claims presented at a later stage of the 
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proceedings. If a party does not pay his share of the requested security amount, the 
other party may provide it. If the requested security amount is not provided by 
either party, the arbitrators may terminate the proceedings, in whole or in part. 
The arbitrators may, during the proceedings, draw on the security amount to cover 
their expenses, but may not, without the consent of the parties or, where one party 
has put up all the security amount, that party, pay themselves from the security 
amount for work done. When an award has been rendered and has become 
enforceable with respect to the arbitrators' compensation, they may draw on the 
security amount to obtain payment. 
Section 37 of the Act stipulates that in the award the arbitrators must determine 
the compensation, which is payable to them, separately for each of them. Pursuant 
to section 41 of the Act, the arbitrators must also include in the award clear 
instructions to the parties as to the procedure to be followed, if they or one of 
them wishes to appeal the decision included in the award relating to the 
compensation to be paid to the arbitrators. Such action must be brought in the 
district court within three months from the date when the party received the award, 
or from the date when any correction, supplement or interpretation thereof was 
made. If the compensation is reduced by the court as a result of an action brought 
by one party, it follows from section 41, paragraph 2, that the reduction applies 
also to any compensation payable by the other party. 
When submitting a request for arbitration to the SCC Institute, the claimant 
must pay an administrative fee of EUR1,000, pursuant to article 6 of the SCC 
Rules. The SCC Institute will also determine a so-called 'advance on costs' to 
cover the total costs, fees and the administrative expenses of the arbitrators and 
any experts of the tribunal as stipulated in article 39. If the advance on costs is not 
paid either in half by each party, or in total by one party, the case is dismissed. 
Only when payment has been made is the case referred to the arbitrators. 
According to article 39 of the SCC Rules, the arbitration costs consist of the fee 
of the arbitrators, the administrative fee of the SCC Institute, compensation due to 
the arbitrators and to the SCC Institute to cover expenses during the proceedings 
and the fees and expenses of any expert appointed by the arbitral tribunal. 
The advance on costs determined at the outset of the proceedings should, as a 
rule, correspond to the final arbitration costs, unless, e.g. the amount in dispute is 
adjusted in the course of the proceedings, or the dispute is settled. The parties can, 
however, generally expect that the advance on costs determined at the outset will 
cover the entire arbitration costs. 
However, the SCC Institute may increase the advance on costs, e.g. in the case 
of submission of a new claim. The advance on costs is usually not reduced, unless 
exceptional circumstances so warrant. 
The advance on costs is thus to cover the estimated arbitration costs. The 
advance on costs is based on the Regulations for Arbitration Costs included in the 
SCC Rules. The amounts stated in the Regulations are related to the amount in 
dispute. For the purpose of calculating the amount in dispute, the value of any 
counterclaim or set-off claim is to be added to the amount of the claim. Interest 
claims are not included. The fees are calculated for the chairman of the tribunal or 
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for a sole arbitrator, and the fee due to co-arbitrators is fixed at 60 per cent of the 
total fee paid to the chairman. The amounts in dispute are arranged at different 
levels with a minimum and maximum fee for each level, thus providing a certain 
amount of flexibility. 
In addition, the SCC Institute may, if it finds that a case requires substantially 
more or less work than normally anticipated, deviate from the fee schedule in the 
Regulations. 
Where the amount in dispute is not specified, e.g. if only declatory relief is 
sought, the SCC Institute will determine the advance on costs on the basis of an 
estimated value of the case. In determining such value, the SCC Institute will, inter 
alia, take into account the subject matter of the dispute, the parties' positions, the 
number of parties, and procedural aspects of the case, including the expected 
length of the proceedings. 
As stated supra, the advance on costs is adjusted only exceptionally. The SCC 
Institute takes the decisions regarding adjustments. However, the initiative to 
adjust the advance on costs would usually be taken by the arbitral tribunal which 
should inform the SCC Institute of the reasons for such adjustment 
The SCC Institute determines the fees of the arbitrators and the fee of the SCC 
Institute in accordance with the Regulations for Arbitration Costs. As a rule, the 
fees will be equivalent to the amounts stated in the decision on advance on costs, 
unless, e.g. the dispute has been settled in the course of the proceedings in which 
case the fees would generally be reduced. 
Before making the award, or closing the case for other reasons, the arbitral 
tribunal would usually ask the SCC Institute to determine the arbitration costs. At 
the same time, the arbitral tribunal should inform the SCC Institute if the fee of 
the co-arbitrators deviates from the fee schedule in the Regulations. 
IV. T H E P R O C E D U R E 
(a) General 
As indicated supra, neither the Act nor the SCC Rules introduce radical, or even 
significant, changes with respect to the procedure in Swedish arbitrations. The 
proceedings will continue to be speedy, efficient and impartial while at the same 
time safeguarding due process. These are characteristics which have become the 
hallmark of arbitrations conducted in Sweden. 
Both the Act and the SCC Rules do, however, contain a number of new 
provisions which are both interesting and important. 
(b) Request for Arbitration 
The first such provision is section 19 of the Act, which regulates the request for 
arbitration. This provision stipulates that the request for arbitration be in writing. 
This is a new provision which did not exist in the old Act. In practice, however, 
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also prior to the Act, the overwhelming majority of requests for arbitration have 
been in writing. It should be noted that it is not required of the claimant to specify 
in detail the relief sought, nor all the circumstances on which the claim is based. It 
is sufficient for the claimant to express a request mat the dispute in question be 
resolved by arbitration and in general to set out the issues which are to be decided 
by the arbitrators. As a result of the provisions in section 19 the arbitrators and the 
respondent will from the outset of the proceedings be informed of the issues to be 
decided. Only at a later stage of the proceedings will the claimant be asked to 
submit specific and exact prayers for relief. This is an important aspect, since in 
Swedish arbitration proceedings an arbitrator may not grant a different or more 
extensive relief than has been properly demanded by a party; he cannot act ultra 
petita. 
A new provision with respect to the request for arbitration is that the claimant 
must appoint its arbitrator when filing the request for arbitration, assuming mat the 
tribunal is to be composed of three arbitrators pursuant to the agreement of the 
parties. Under the old Act each party had 14 days to communicate to the other 
party its choice of arbitrator. If an arbitrator is not appointed in the request for 
arbitration, the request has not been validly made. One consequence of this may 
be of significant practical and legal importance, i.e. that the request for arbitration 
will not prevent the statute of limitations from running. In situations where the 
parties have not agreed on the number of arbitrators, the claimant is not required 
to appoint its arbitrator when submitting its request for arbitration. 
The SCC Rules, article 5, contain provisions with respect to the request for 
arbitration, including provisions on registration fees, dismissal of the request and 
the date of commencement of the arbitration. The Rules are more detailed man 
the relevant sections of the Act. 
Article 5 of the SCC Rules requires the claimant to include in its request for 
arbitration the following: 
(1) a statement of the names, addresses, telephone and fax numbers and e-
mail addresses of the parties and their counsel; 
(2) a summary of die nature of the dispute; 
(3) a preliminary statement of the relief sought by the claimant; 
(4) a copy of the arbitration agreement or clause under which the dispute is to 
be setded; and 
(5) if applicable a statement identifying the arbitrator appointed by the 
claimant including the arbitrator's address, telephone and fax numbers 
and e-mail address. 
One aspect of the arbitral procedure which sometimes creates problems from 
a practical point of view is that of notification of the parties, both of the request 
for arbitration and replies thereto, as well as of subsequent briefs submitted in 
me arbitration. In this respect die SCC Rules, in particular article 12, offer 
considerable flexibility. The notification may be delivered by courier or 
registered mail, fax, e-mail or any other metiiod for which a written record is 
available. A notification is deemed to have been received, at the latest, on the 
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date it would normally have been received, given the chosen means of 
communication. 
(c) Place of Arbitration 
It follows from section 22 of the Act, that it is for the parties to determine the place 
of arbitration. They may do so direcdy, or indirecdy by reference to arbitration 
rules administered by a certain arbitral institution. When the parties have failed to 
do so, the place of arbitration is to be determined by the arbitrators. If the place of 
arbitration is Sweden, hearings may nevertheless be held abroad, unless otherwise 
agreed by the parties. The place of arbitration is much more than simply a 
question of geography. The place of arbitration has important legal consequences, 
since in the absence of an agreement between the parties the procedural rules will 
be based on the arbitration law of the place of arbitration. 
As mentioned supra, the tribunal may hold hearings and meetings outside the 
place of arbitration, including outside Sweden. This may be appropriate in 
circumstances where witnesses cannot travel to the place of arbitration, or if there 
is a need for site inspections. In some cases it may be necessary to have hearings 
and meetings in several countries outside the agreed place of arbitration. The 
place of arbitration must be stated in the award. When the award is said to be 
given at a certain place, such place will be deemed to be the place of arbitration. 
(d) New Claims and Counterclaims 
Article 23 of the Act stipulates that within the period of time determined by the 
arbitrators the claimant is to state its claims (prayers for relief) in respect of the 
issue described in die request for arbitration as well as the circumstances relied on 
by die claimant in support tfiereof. Thereafter, again within the period of time 
determined by the arbitrators, the respondent is to state its position in relation to 
die claims and describe the circumstances relied upon by it in support of its 
position. Section 23 thus provides that it is for the tribunal to determine the time 
widiin which die claimant shall state its claims in respect of die issues described in 
me process for arbitration. The claimant thus has a duty but also a right to present 
its prayers for relief and the circumstances invoked by die claimant in support 
thereof. If the claimant fails to do so widiin the time period determined by the 
tribunal, the claimant may be precluded from presenting its case. It should be 
noted, however, diat pursuant to paragraph 2 of section 23, die claimant may 
submit new claims and amend its claims subject to certain conditions. The 
respondent has die same rights and obligations as die claimant in mis respect. 
First, new or amended claims, as well as counterclaims, must be covered by the 
arbitration agreement. Should one of the parties present a new claim which is not 
covered by the arbitration agreement and if the other party fails to object, die odier 
party may be deemed to have waived its right to object. In this way a claim which is 
not covered by the arbitration agreement may neverdieless be dealt with by die 
arbitrators and decided in die award. Anodier condition is that die arbitrators do 
not consider it inappropriate to rule on the new or amended claim taking into 
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consideration the time at which the claims are submitted and odier circumstances. 
The later a new or amended claim is presented the more likely it is that the 
arbitrators will reject it. It should be noted that under the Act the arbitrators are 
expected to take a generous attitude towards such claims as long as they are 
covered by the arbitration agreement. Ultimately, however, it is in the discretion of 
the arbitrators to accept or to reject new or amended claims. 
(e) Due Process 
Section 21 of the Act stipulates that the arbitrators must handle the dispute in an 
impartial, practical and speedy manner. They must also act in accordance with die 
decisions of the parties in so far as there is no impediment to do so. Section 21 of 
the Act thus repeats one of the main principles long enshrined in Swedish 
arbitration law. In administering the case, the arbitrators are bound to comply with 
the stipulations of the Act as regards the procedure, but primarily with the wishes 
and agreements of the parties. The parties may thus agree on a particular 
procedure to be followed by the tribunal. As the language of section 21 indicates, 
however, there are certain limits to the arbitrators' duty to comply with the 
procedural agreements of the parties. Generally speaking, however, arbitrators are 
free to disregard the agreement of die parties only in extraordinary situations; e.g. 
if the procedural rules agreed to by the parties would involve or entail illegal or 
improper conduct, the arbitrators would not have a duty to follow such instructions 
from the parties. 
It should be noted that a party which is dissatisfied with the procedure as 
applied by the tribunal cannot turn to a court of law and request that the court 
intervene in the arbitration, or to order the tribunal to undertake certain acts or 
refrain from taking certain acts. The Act does not contain any provision 
empowering courts to intervene in an arbitration. 
With respect to rules governing the procedure before the tribunal, the SCC 
Rules set out supplementary provisions. According to die Rules, for example, the 
tribunal may decide that the chairman alone is entitled to make procedural rulings. 
This is often a very practical approach when it comes to the management of the 
case. It should be noted, however, tfiat unless the parties have provided for tins 
possibility most procedural decisions must be taken by the tribunal as a whole. 
Section 24 of the Act stipulates that arbitrators shall afford the parties, to the 
extent necessary, an opportunity to present their respective cases in writing or 
orally. If requested by a party, and provided that the parties have not otherwise 
agreed, an oral hearing will be held prior to the determination of an issue referred 
to the arbitrators. 
The arbitrators' duty to afford each party sufficient opportunity to present its 
case is the same as provided for in the old Act. This principle embodies a right for 
each party to have an opportunity to respond to the arguments of die other party. 
Section 24, paragraph 1, makes it clear, however, that this right is not an unfettered 
right; it is limited by the words 'to die extent necessary'. This is an important 
limitation enabling the arbitrators to prevent obstructions or delays by a party. No 
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party has an absolute right to introduce material which in the arbitrators' view is 
not required for the determination of the claim. 
The parties may agree that no oral hearing shall be held. The arbitrators are 
bound by such an agreement. However, a party can never agree in advance to 
waive its right to present its case to the extent necessary. 
The second paragraph of section 24 stipulates that a party shall be given an 
opportunity to review all documents and all other materials pertaining to the 
dispute which are supplied to the arbitrators by die other party or another person. 
It reflects a minimum standard which is normally met by a party sending the 
documents concerning the dispute to the other party. An obligation to make 
available documents to the other party does not necessarily mean, however, that 
the other party must always be afforded a time within which to comment on the 
documents. 
For the avoidance of doubt, it should be pointed out that the arbitral tribunal is 
under no duty to make available to the parties its own notes, minutes or other 
documents prepared by it for the purpose of its own deliberations. 
Where one of the parties, without valid cause, fails to appear at a hearing or 
otherwise fails to comply with an order of the arbitrators, such failure does not 
prevent the proceedings from continuing, nor the resolution of the dispute on the 
basis of the existing materials. This provision, set out in the third paragraph of 
section 24, is important for an efficient procedure. It also makes it clear that the 
arbitrators are not allowed to make an award by default; they must always 
determine the dispute on the basis of the existing materials before them. 
(f) Evidence 
Article 25 of the Act stipulates that it is for the parties to supply and present the 
evidence. This has been the practice in Swedish arbitrations since the introduction 
of the Procedural Code in 1948. Since the old 1929 Arbitration Act antedated the 
Procedural Code, the rules and principles laid down in the Procedural Code, and 
now in the Act, were not reflected in the old Act. Although the arbitrators may 
advise a party that it has the burden of proof with respect to a certain fact, it is 
always for that party to decide what evidence to produce. The arbitrators will not 
give any instructions to the parties in this respect. The arbitrators may at their own 
initiative, however, appoint experts unless both parties object thereto. In practice it 
would seem that most arbitrators are reluctant to appoint an expert unless both 
parties agree. 
It is for the parties to call witnesses and to ensure that they are present at the 
hearing. Should a witness not appear the party is nevertheless not deemed to have 
waived its right for that witness to be called. It is for the arbitrators to decide how 
and when the witness can be heard. 
Article 25 further stipulates that the arbitrators may refuse to allow evidence 
where such evidence is manifestly irrelevant to the case or where such refusal is 
justified having regard to the time at which the evidence is presented. This 
principle is inherited from the old Act. It is an important feature of Swedish 
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arbitral proceedings and is in keeping with the overall duty of the arbitrators to 
manage the case in the most efficient manner. 
The arbitrators may not administer oaths, nor may they impose conditional 
fines or otherwise use compulsory measures in order to obtain evidence. The Act 
does not modify the old Act with respect to the administering of oaths. The 
Swedish Government was not prepared to grant the arbitrators such wide-ranging 
powers, although they exist in some other legal systems. 
The SCC Rules closely follow the Act as regards the presentation of evidence. 
Article 26 of the SCC Rules reflects a well established rule in Swedish court 
proceedings that a party must specify what it intends to prove with each piece of 
evidence. This is usually done in a so-called 'statement of evidence'. It is not 
enough merely to submit bundles of documents; the party must be precise as to 
what each document is intended to prove. With respect to the hearing of 
witnesses, it should be noted that unlike the approach in many common law 
countries, witnesses in Swedish arbitrations are not expected to develop the facts of 
the case. This is the role of the parties and their counsel. The hearing of witnesses 
in the Swedish tradition is limited to contested issues of facts. 
As a rule, witnesses are not allowed to attend the hearing before testifying. 
Witnesses are normally examined by the parties or their representatives, rather 
than the arbitrator, in the manner used in common law jurisdictions, i.e. by direct 
examination, cross-examination and re-examination. Another important feature of 
the Swedish approach is that the witness is both permitted and expected to relate 
his entire story at once, without interruption and without being prompted by direct 
questions from either counsel or arbitrators. The witness would thus normally start 
by giving a narrative statement of what he knows or has seen or heard, before he is 
subjected to direct questions and cross-examination. 
There are very few rules of evidence in the Swedish procedural and arbitration 
law. There is, e.g. no prohibition against hearsay. The arbitrators may freely 
evaluate witness testimony as well as any other evidence. In fact, arbitrators may 
evaluate almost everything - including any occurence during the proceedings - but 
are expected to identify and explain in the award the factors which have been 
relevant for the arbitrators when reaching their conclusions. 
Where a party wishes a witness, an expert, or a party to testify under oath, that 
party may, after obtaining the consent of the arbitrators, submit an application to 
such effect to the district court. This also applies if a party wishes the other party, 
or other person to be ordered to produce written or physical evidence. If the 
arbitrators find that the measure is justified, having regard to the evidence in the 
case, they are to grant the request. Where the measure may lawfully be taken, the 
district court will grant the application. The provisions of the Swedish Procedural 
Code apply with respect to such measures. The arbitrators will be called to the 
hearing and given the opportunity to ask questions. If the arbitrators are absent, 
the hearing may nevertheless proceed. 
The arbitrators must determine whether in their opinion the measure is 
justified. They may reject the request if they consider that the evidence already 
presented to them is sufficient. They may also refuse approval if they think that the 
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costs involved would be exorbitant, or that the application is made solely for some 
extraneous reason, such as a desire to obtain publicity. 
In international arbitration, however, it is likely that the witnesses will not be 
resident in Sweden and thus not subject to a Swedish district court's jurisdiction. 
Foreign courts may assist in obtaining evidence from such witnesses. The extent to 
which this can be done will, however, depend on international conventions or 
local law. 
As will be discussed infra, it may be of critical importance for a party to protest 
against procedural irregularities. This aspect is addressed in article 29 of the SCC 
Rules. This provision stipulates that, if, during the proceedings, a party fails 
promptly to state an objection to any deviation from the provisions of the 
arbitration agreement, the SCC Rules or other rules which are applicable to the 
proceedings, it shall be deemed to have irrevocably waived the right to object. 
(g) Interim Security Measures 
Finally, mention must be made of section 25, paragraph 4, of the Act which 
introduces the possibility for arbitrators to order interim security measures, at the 
request of a party, unless the parties have agreed otherwise. Article 31 of the SCC 
Rules sets out similar provisions. It should be noted that both the Act and the 
Rules stipulate that the arbitrators may order the requesting party to provide 
reasonable security for damage which may be incurred by the other party as a 
result of the measure in question. Although both provisions constitute welcome 
clarifications of Swedish arbitration law, it must be remembered that any decision 
by a tribunal on interim security measures - whether styled 'award' or 'order' -
would not be enforceable in Swedish courts. The extent to which they might be 
enforceable by courts in other countries is, of course, a decision to be taken by 
such courts. 
V. T H E A W A R D 
The Act sets out relatively detailed provisions relating to the arbitral award. They 
are to be found in sections 27 to 32 of the Act. Before these provisions are 
addressed, it is proposed briefly to discuss the law and/or rules which are applied 
to resolve a dispute on the merits. 
(a) Applicable Law 
Just as in the old Act, the Act does not have any provision on the rules applicable 
to the substance of a dispute. The generally held opinion is that, unless the parties 
have agreed otherwise, the arbitrators are to base their decision on the applicable 
law. Moreover, the arbitrators must apply such law and/or rules as have been 
chosen by the parties. Thus, party autonomy reigns supreme. True there are 
certain - but generally speaking very limited - exceptions from this fundamental 
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principle of international commercial arbitration. Arbitrators may also decide 
cases ex aequo et bono or as amiables compositeurs, but only if the parties have 
expressly authorised them to do so. 
The first question to be addressed by an arbitral tribunal is that of which conflict 
of laws system to apply. If the parties have agreed on a conflict of laws system, it is 
clear that the arbitrators must follow such instructions of the parties. If no 
agreement has been reached by the parties, however, the tribunal may in all 
likelihood in its discretion decide which conflict of laws system to apply. Swedish 
law does nor stipulate that arbitrators sitting in Sweden must apply Swedish conflict 
of laws rules. On the other hand, if the parties have agreed in the arbitration clause 
on Sweden as the place of arbitration, it will often be presumed that such choice 
also includes the Swedish conflict of laws rules. 
In contrast to the Act, the SCC Rules have provisions on rules applicable to the 
substance of the dispute. Paragraph 1 of article 24 provides that the arbitral 
tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with the law or rules of law agreed 
by the parties. In the absence of such an agreement, the arbitral tribunal shall 
apply the law or rules of law which it considers to be most appropriate. It is not 
necessary for the tribunal first to identify which conflict of laws rules to apply, but 
they may apply substantive law, or rules of law, direcdy. In many situations this will 
in all likelihood facilitate the decision-making of the arbitrators, with respect to 
applicable law. Paragraph 2 provides that any reference to the law of a given State 
shall be construed as direcdy referring to the substantive law of that State and not 
to its conflict of laws rules. Paragraph 3 provides that the arbitral tribunal shall 
decide the dispute ex aequo et bono or as amiable compositeur only if the parties 
have expressly authorised it to do so. 
(b) Awards and Decisions 
Section 27 of the Act is new and defines, for the first time in statutory language, 
the concepts of award and decision. The provision also regulates when a 
determination by the arbitrators should take one form or the other. In the first 
paragraph it is stipulated that the issues referred to the arbitrators shall be 
decided in an award and that, if the arbitrators terminate the arbitral proceedings 
without deciding such issues, such decision is also an award. Other decisions, 
which are not awards, are defined as 'decisions'. This means, inter alia, that if the 
parties have not referred the issue of the validity and applicability of the 
arbitration agreement to the tribunal, a ruling by the tribunal on its own 
competence takes the form of a 'decision', if the tribunal finds that it has 
jurisdiction to decide the dispute referred to it. If the tribunal, however, finds 
that it does not have jurisdiction to decide the dispute referred to it, the arbitral 
proceedings are terminated through an 'award'. This means that a determination 
of the tribunal that it lacks jurisdiction to decide the issue referred to it becomes 
res judicata, unless it is appealed to the district court. That such appeal is 
possible follows from section 36 of the Act. 
The 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
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Foreign Arbitral Awards covers only arbitral awards, but not other decisions of an 
arbitral tribunal. The concept 'arbitral award' is, however, not defined in the 
Convention. It is thus possible mat a determination by which a tribunal terminates 
the arbitral proceedings without deciding the issues and which according to the Act 
is an 'arbitral award' - at least in some cases - may not fall under the Convention. 
The Swedish Procedural Code provides that the respondent has the right to 
insist on a judgment even if the plaintiff withdraws its action and the withdrawal 
occurs only after the defence has been filed. Under the old Act it was unclear 
whether the respondent in an arbitration had a similar right to have the dispute 
resolved in the event the claimant withdrew its claim. 
Article 28 now introduces such a right for the respondent in an arbitration. The 
provision applies irrespective of whether a claim is withdrawn before or after a 
statement of defence has been submitted. If a party requests that the tribunal rule 
on a claim which has been withdrawn, the tribunal has no discretion in this respect 
but must rule on the claim. 
The same rule is included in article 35, paragraph 1, of the SCC Rules. 
Paragraph 2 of the same article provides that if a party who has not yet paid an 
advance on costs, requests the arbitral tribunal to rule on a withdrawn claim, the 
Institute may, as a condition for such ruling, order the requesting party to pay an 
advance on costs. 
Section 29 of the Act gives arbitrators significant discretion in rendering 
separate awards. It stipulates mat arbitrators may, unless objections are raised by 
both parties, decide part of the dispute in a separate award. It is important to note, 
however, that a claim relied on as a set-off claim must be ruled on in the same 
award as the main claim. If a party has admitted a claim, wholly or partially, a 
partial award may be rendered with respect to that which has been admitted. 
Section 29, paragraph 1, further provides that a specific issue, which is of 
importance to the resolution of the dispute, may be decided in a separate award. 
Such a separate award may determine liability, but leave the quantum of damages 
for later determination. Also in cases where the claimant bases his claim on 
alternative grounds, it is possible under section 29 for the arbitral tribunal to rule 
on one of the grounds in a separate award. 
The SCC Rules also provide for-separate awards. According to article 34 of the 
Rules, a separate issue or a part of the matter in dispute may be decided in a 
separate award. Also where a party has partially admitted a claim, the tribunal may 
render a separate award based on such admission. The Rules do not, however, 
provide that a claim invoked as a defence by way of set-off must be adjudicated in 
the same award as the main claim. 
(c) Award Period and Voting 
According to section 18 of the old Act, a six month time period applied for 
making an award in cases where both parties were Swedish residents. This time 
limit did not, however, apply to non-Swedish parties. There is no time limit at all in 
the Act. The parties are of course free to agree on an award period memselves, if 
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they deem it appropriate, but if mey fail to do so no statutory time limit will apply. 
If the parties have agreed on an award period, they must also agree on an 
extension of that limit, if necessary, since an award made after the expiration of the 
award period may later be set aside. 
Under article 33 of the SCC Rules, an award must be rendered no later than six 
months from the date when the case was transferred to the tribunal. The Institute 
may extend this period of time. The extension can be granted by the SCC Institute 
not only at the request of the arbitral tribunal, but also at the request of a party. 
The wording of article 33 does indeed suggest mat the Institute may extend the 
award period at its own initiative. 
Section 30, paragraph 2, of the Act provides that unless the parties have 
decided omerwise, the opinion of the majority of the arbitrators participating in the 
determination shall prevail. If no majority is attained for any opinion, the opinion 
of the chairman shall prevail. The same rule is included in article 30 of the SCC 
Rules. 
The first paragraph of section 30 sets out a new important rule which prevents 
an arbitrator from obstructing the proceedings by failing to attend deliberations of 
the tribunal. The provision stipulates that where an arbitrator fails, without valid 
cause, to participate in the determination of an issue by the arbitral tribunal, such 
failure will not prevent the other arbitrators from ruling on the matter. The same 
rule is included in article 32, paragraph 2, of the SCC Rules. 
(d) Rendering die Award 
The rendering of an award is important in several respects. With respect to time, 
the award must be given within the period of time (if any) stipulated by the parties. 
The three month period within which an arbitrator may bring a court action 
against the award regarding his fee is calculated from the time the award is 
rendered pursuant to section 41, paragraph 1, of the Act. 
The place at which the award is rendered is also important. It determines which 
Court of Appeal has jurisdiction over actions to declare an award invalid, or to 
have it set aside, as stipulated in section 43, paragraph 1, of the Act. It also 
determines which district court has jurisdiction over actions concerning the 
arbitrators' fees. 
The award must be delivered to the parties immediately. This follows from 
section 31, paragraph 3, of the Act. If the award contains an order to compensate 
the arbitrators, fhe arbitrators have an interest in communicating a copy of the 
award to each party as quickly as possible. Otherwise, the three month period 
within which a party may bring an action challenging the arbitrators' fees will not 
start to run. It may also be in the interest of the winning party to have die award 
communicated to the otirer party as quickly as possible, so tiiat the three month 
period for bringing an action to have the award set aside starts to run. 
There is, however, no statutory requirement as to the manner in which the 
award is to be communicated to the parties. The award needs merely be sent by 
ordinary mail to the parties. The duties of the arbitrators may, however, be 
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discharged in a convenient manner by sending each of the parties a signed copy of 
the award by registered mail. 
Swedish law does not require the award to be filed or registered with any court 
or authority. This is not even possible under Swedish law. Article 38 of the SCC 
Rules provides, however, that a tribunal shall, after the close of the proceedings, 
submit to the Institute a copy of every award and written decision issued in the 
case, as well as of all recorded minutes relating thereto. Such documents are kept 
on file by the SCC Institute. 
(e) Correction and Interpretation of Awards 
Just as in the old Act, the Act is silent as to the finality of arbitral awards. It is clear, 
however, that an arbitral award on the merits is final and binding and constitutes 
res judicata as of the time that it is rendered. In addition, a final award renders the 
arbitrators functus officio. Consequently, as of the moment that the award is 
rendered, the arbitrators no longer have jurisdiction over the dispute. Section 27, 
paragraph 4, of the Act, explicitly states that the mandate of the arbitrators is 
completed when they have rendered a final award. The arbitrators do, however, 
retain jurisdiction to correct and interpret awards. 
Section 32 of the Act, which is a new provision, sets out rules on the correction 
of awards to the effect that if the arbitrators find that an award contains an obvious 
error as a result of typographical, computational or other similar mistake by the 
arbitrators or another person, or if the arbitrators have failed to decide an issue 
which should have been dealt with in the award, the arbitrators may within 30 days 
of the date when the award was rendered, decide to correct or supplement the 
award. They may also correct or supplement an award or interpret the operative 
part of the award, where any party so requests within 30 days of the receipt of the 
award by that party. Such time limits cannot be extended. 
Where, upon request by any of the parties, the arbitrators decide to correct, or 
interpret the operative part of an award, this must be done within 30 days from the 
date of the receipt by the arbitrators of the request. Where the arbitrators decide 
to supplement the award, this must be done within 60 days. The time limits cannot 
be extended. 
Before the arbitral tribunal takes any decision referred to supra, the parties 
should be given an opportunity to express their views with respect to the 
contemplated measure. 
Article 37 of the SCC Rules sets out similar rules on the correction of an award 
and on additional awards. The said article provides that any obvious miscalculation 
or clerical error in an award or decision shall be corrected by the tribunal. Within 
30 days of receiving the award the tribunal shall, if a party so requests, decide a 
question which should have been decided in the award, but which was not decided 
therein. The article further stipulates that within 30 days of receiving the award, the 
tribunal may, if a party so requests, provide an interpretation thereof in writing. 
The Rules thus seem to go further than the Act since the right of the tribunal to 
provide an interpretation of an award is not explicitly limited to the operative part 
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of the award. Finally, the said article provides that the arbitral tribunal shall, before 
it takes any action referred to supra, give the parties an opportunity to express their 
views with respect to the measure. 
VI. FINALITY A N D ENFORCEABILITY OF 
ARBITRAL A W A R D S 
One of the undisputed advantages of arbitration is that an arbitral award, in most 
legal systems, is final and binding when rendered. This means that an award is final 
and binding on the merits, i.e. it cannot be appealed or retried on the merits. On 
the other hand, most legal systems have rules allowing for the setting aside of 
arbitral awards on certain narrowly defined procedural grounds. The efficiency 
and attraction of a country as a place for arbitration depends to a large extent on 
how restrictive its legislation is in this respect. Generally speaking, Swedish courts 
have traditionally been reluctant to set aside arbitral awards. 
One of the cornerstones of modern arbitration, therefore, is the finality of the 
arbitral award. Another fundamental aspect - and often closely related to finality -
is the enforceability of arbitral awards. At the international level, much has been 
achieved by the widespread acceptance of the 1958 New York Convention. Most 
important trading nations today, including Sweden, have acceded to the 
Convention. The rules and principles laid down in the New York Convention 
do however, leave room for significant differences in the enforcement procedures 
of different countries. Enforcement rules in national law do therefore continue to 
play an important role in international commercial arbitration. 
(a) Finality of Arbitral Awards 
(i) Introduction 
The old Act made a distinction between invalid and challengeable awards. 
The first category includes awards which were invalid per se and which did not 
require any activity from any of the parties; if the award was invalid it was so ab 
initio and forever. The second category, challengeable awards, covers awards 
which could be set aside by a court of law at the request of a party under certain 
circumstances. The party had to make its request within a stipulated period of 
time. 
In the Bill leading to the adoption of the Act, the distinction between invalid 
and challengeable awards was discussed. This discussion was primarily prompted 
by the fact that the UNCITRAL Model Law, and a number of Arbitration Acts in 
other jurisdictions, do not make such a distinction. In the Model Law, for 
example, there are provisions only with respect to awards which may be 
challenged. It was discussed whether or not it was necessary, or desirable, to 
maintain this distinction in Swedish law, or if only provisions with respect to 
challengeable awards should be included, in line with the approach of the Model 
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Law. During this discussion it was emphasised that awards should be considered 
invalid only where a third party was involved, or where there was an element of 
public interest, whereas awards should be considered challengeable where only the 
interests of the parties to the dispute in question were involved. It was suggested 
that the distinction between invalid and challengeable awards be preserved, 
primarily with a view to emphasising the difference between these two different 
categories of interest. It was suggested that the best and clearest way to emphasise 
this difference would be to group all circumstances which might lead to the 
invalidity of an award under one provision, while all circumstances which could 
lead to the setting aside of an award would be addressed in another, separate, 
provision. This is why the Act maintains the distinction between invalid awards on 
the one hand and challengeable awards on the other hand. 
Section 33 of the Act deals with invalid awards and section 34 with challengeable 
awards. These two sections will be discussed infra. The Act introduces two new 
provisions which are of importance in the present context, i.e. section 51, which 
deals with so-called 'exclusion agreements' and section 35 which makes it possible, 
under certain circumstances, for a court of law to remit a case to the arbitral tribunal 
with a view to remedying procedural defects which would otherwise lead to the 
setting aside of an award. These two new provisions will also be discussed infra. 
(ii) Invalid awards 
Section 33 of the Act sets out three grounds for the invalidity of an arbitral award. 
These grounds are: 
(a) the arbitral award decides an issue which is non-arbitrable; 
(b) the award or the manner in which the award has been rendered violates 
Swedish public policy; and 
(c) the award has not been made in writing and it has not been signed by the 
arbitrators. 
It should be noted at the outset that these three grounds are the only grounds on 
which an arbitral award may be rendered invalid. The list of grounds in section 33 
is thus exhaustive. If any of these grounds exist, the award is simply invalid ab initio 
and forever. A party need not take any judicial action to render it so. As a practical 
matter, however, the declaration by a Swedish court of law that an award is invalid 
would typically facilitate raising defences against the enforcement of an award in 
other countries, particularly in countries which are signatories to the New York 
Convention. There is no time limit for a claim to have an award declared invalid; 
this is logical, since if an award is invalid, it is invalid forever. 
As far as the first ground, non-arbitrability, is concerned, it must be emphasised 
that the Act itself does not contain any exhaustive definition of arbitrability. The only 
explanation of the concept is found in section 1 of the Act, which, as discussed 
supra, sets out the formula generally used under Swedish law, i.e. that an arbitrable 
dispute is a dispute which the parties may resolve by entering into a settlement 
agreement. As a matter of practice, however, this general definition is quite helpful 
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in determining whether or not a particular dispute is arbitrable under Swedish law. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of situations where it is not possible to make this 
decision on the basis of the general formula. The answer will then have to be sought 
in the statutes which regulate the subject matter of the dispute in question. One 
issue, which has been discussed from time to time is whether or not patent disputes 
are arbitrable. The answer to this question is to be found in Swedish patent 
legislation, from which one concludes that disputes concerning the validity of patents 
are not arbitrable. Another question which has been the subject of debate is whether 
or not competition law disputes are arbitrable. As mentioned supra, this issue has 
been expressly addressed in section 1 of the Act, which stipulates that the civil law 
consequences, as between the parties, of competition law disputes may be submitted 
to arbitration, but not issues of competition law which may contain an element of 
public interest. 
The second invalidity ground mentioned in section 33, violation of public 
policy, is new. Needless to say, public policy may play an important role with 
respect to the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, where 
violation of public policy is one ground for refusing recognition and enforcement. 
The concept of public policy is a novelty, however, in so far as it relates to Swedish 
arbitral awards, i.e. arbitral awards rendered in Sweden. The provisions of 
section 33 were inspired by the Model Law. As a result of the introduction of this 
particular ground of invalidity, it was said in the travaux preparatoires that the 
grounds in section 33 are exhaustive. It goes without saying that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to enumerate with any precision the circumstances which may 
constitute a violation of public policy. It will be for the courts to establish the 
parameters for this particular ground of invalidity. At this stage, however, it is 
possible to select a number of situations which, in all likelihood, violate Swedish 
policy. For example, if parties try to enforce, in arbitration, claims based on 
criminal acts, such as an obligation to pay a bribe, an arbitral award ordering such 
payment is likely to be deemed to violate Swedish public policy. Another rather 
obvious candidate would be an arbitral award which has been produced as a result 
of criminal acts, e.g. as a result of threats against arbitrators or the bribing of 
arbitrators. There is, however, a third category of situations which is more 
problematic in this respect, i.e. that the very concept of public policy, to a certain 
limited extent, opens the door to a review of the merits of a dispute. It goes without 
saying that it is only in very exceptional cases that an arbitral award can be said to 
violate Swedish public policy, because the applicable law has been applied 
wrongfully, or because the arbitrators have failed to apply a specific provision of a 
specific law. There are, however, statements in the travaux preparatoires which 
seem to indicate that if arbitrators have failed to apply a mandatory rule of law, 
where that law is mandatory because it is intended to safeguard the interests of the 
general public or of a third party, such failure may lead to die award being 
declared invalid on grounds of violation of public policy. In the opinion of die 
author however, it is clear that this should occur only in very exceptional cases, if at 
all. 
There is yet anodier category of situations which are likely to fall within the 
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public policy provisions of section 33, i.e. arbitral awards which order one of die 
parties to take actions, steps and measures which are prohibited by Swedish law. In 
addition, it is possible that an arbitral award which amounts to a penalty, or is 
punitive in nature, could fall under the public policy provision, for example, where 
the arbitrators have ordered one of the parties to pay punitive damages on the 
basis of US law. 
The discussion supra must be seen only as possible examples. As mentioned 
supra, it is vital that the public policy provision of section 33 be applied in a very 
restrictive fashion. It should also be pointed out that there are no clear and 
watertight distinctions between the first two invalidity grounds, i.e. between non-
arbitrability and violation of public policy. Indeed, non-arbitrability is merely an 
aspect of public policy. For example, with respect to claims based on criminal acts 
one could argue both that such claims are non-arbitrable and that an award which 
is based on such claims violates public policy. Both approaches would, in the 
opinion of the author, be equally acceptable. It is submitted however, that from a 
practical point of view the distinction between non-arbitrability and public policy in 
this situation is of little importance. 
The third invalidity ground mentioned in section 33 deals with the requirement 
that arbitral awards be in writing and signed by the arbitrators. One consequence 
of this provision is that oral arbitral awards are not valid and that an award can only 
be rendered in writing. In addition, the arbitral award must be signed as prescribed 
by section 31 of the Act. 
It should be noted that a finding of invalidity does not necessarily mean diat the 
entire award is automatically invalid. If the arbitrators have decided issues which 
are non-arbitrable and, at die same time, issues which are arbitrable, only that part 
of the award which deals with the non-arbitrable issue will be void. This does 
presuppose, however, that it is possible to separate the non-arbitrable issues from 
the arbitrable ones in the award. 
It is important to note that the fact that there was no arbitration agreement is no 
longer a ground for invalidity as was fhe case in the old Act. Lack of an arbitration 
agreement is now a ground on which an arbitral award may be challenged and is 
thus dealt with in section 34 of the Act. This amendment has been made on the 
basis of the philosophy described above, i.e. that only matters which pertain to the 
interests of the general public, or of a third party, should result in an award being 
invalid. The existence or non-existence of an arbitration agreement is clearly 
something which primarily concerns the parties to the dispute in question; they 
may, e.g. enter into an arbitration agreement, or amend an arbitration agreement, 
during the course of the proceedings. That is why this ground is now to be found 
in section 34 of the Act rather than in section 33. 
(Hi) Challengeable awards 
Pursuant to section 34, paragraph 1, of the Act an arbitral award will, at the request 
of a party, be wholly or partially set aside: 
(a) if it is not covered by a valid arbitration agreement between the parties; 
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(b) if the arbitrators have rendered the award after the expiration of the 
period decided on by the parties, or where the arbitrators have otherwise 
exceeded their mandate; 
(c) if arbitral proceedings, according to section 47, should not have taken 
place in Sweden; 
(d) if an arbitrator has been appointed contrary to the agreement between the 
parties or the Act; 
(e) if an arbitrator was unauthorised due to any circumstance set out in 
sections 7 or 8; or 
(f) if, without fault of the party, there otherwise occurred an irregularity in 
the course of the proceedings which probably influenced the outcome of 
the case. 
The principal difference between section 34 of the Act and section 21 of the 
old Act is that sub-paragraph (a), 'valid arbitration agreement', has been 
reclassified as a circumstance which requires a party to challenge an award. Sub-
paragraph (a) does not only apply where the parties have not entered into any valid 
arbitration agreement at all, but also applies where the arbitration agreement is 
invalid ab initio, or if the arbitrators have decided on a question which is not 
covered by the arbitration agreement. 
Another change as compared to the old Act is that the ground referred to in 
sub-paragraph (f) supra has been more narrowly defined, such that an alleged 
irregularity of procedure must in fact have been likely to influence the outcome of 
the case. The language used in the old Act was more vague: 'which in probability 
may be assumed to have influenced the decision'. The new wording of sub-
paragraph (f) is intended to make it more difficult to rely on this ground, in that 
the party who challenges an award must prove that the procedural irregularity is in 
fact likely to have influenced the outcome of the case. 
Examples of procedural irregularities which may fall under sub-paragraph (0 
include lis pendens, disregard of res judicata, violation of due process, relief in 
excess of claim (ultra petita), award based on facts not relied upon by the parties 
and the rendering of an incomplete award. 
The second paragraph of section 34 sets out certain waiver rules. While the 
language has been changed from that used in the old Act, the second paragraph is 
not intended to change the law itself. This means that a party is not entitled to rely 
on a circumstance where it may be considered to have waived its right to rely on 
that circumstance by taking part in the proceedings without any objection based on 
that circumstance, or otherwise. The fact that a party has appointed an arbitrator in 
a case does not imply a waiver of that party's right to challenge the jurisdiction of 
the tribunal in question. This language is new but merely codifies existing case law. 
It should also be noted that the time period within which an action must be 
brought under section 34 has been extended from 60 days to three months. This 
has been done to bring the text closer to the UNCITRAL Model Law, which 
provides for a three month period. Section 34 also stipulates that after the 
expiration of the three month period, a party may not introduce new legal grounds 
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for challenging the award. Again, while the language is new, it codifies existing case 
law. It should be noted that the term 'ground' does not refer to the different 
grounds enumerated in section 34, but rather to the more legal-technical concept 
of a 'legal ground'. This means, e.g. that if a party has challenged an award by 
arguing that one of the arbitrators was not qualified to act as arbitrator, it could not, 
after the expiration of the three month period, argue that another arbitrator was 
not qualified to act. On the other hand, a party would not be prevented from 
adjusting certain sets of fact which come within the same legal ground. For 
example, if a party has argued that an arbitrator should be prevented from acting as 
arbitrator because he is the nephew of the other party, it could argue, even after 
the expiration of the three month period, that the same arbitrator is actually the 
son of the other party. 
(iv) Exclusion agreements 
A new provision in the Act, section 51, introduces the concept of exclusion 
agreements into Swedish arbitration statutes. Section 51 stipulates that two non-
Swedish parties may enter into an exclusion agreement, by which diey waive in 
advance the right under section 34 of the Act to have recourse against awards. This 
presupposes, however, that die parties in question are commercial parties and that 
the relationship between them is of a commercial nature. Consequendy, 
section 51 stipulates that if neither of the parties in a commercial relationship 
has its domicile, or place of business, in Sweden, the parties may, by agreement in 
writing, exclude or limit die applicability of the grounds for setting aside awards 
which are listed in section 34 of the Act. It is important to note that the exclusion 
agreement must be in writing and that it must specifically refer to the parties' 
waiver of the right to challenge an award pursuant to section 34 of the Act. This 
means, e.g. that it will not be sufficient for parties to refer to institutional rules, 
such as e.g. the ICC Rules, which may contain clauses similar to an exclusion 
agreement. Instead, under section 51, as mentioned, the parties must explicitly 
state that they waive their rights pursuant to section 34. 
Section 51 also means that it is not possible to waive the invalidity grounds set 
out in section 33. Invalidity is beyond the control of the parties; it is beyond party 
autonomy. Since die invalidity grounds have been formulated with a view to 
safeguarding die interest of die general public and/or of third parties, it is only 
logical that parties cannot waive such grounds. 
In accepting exclusion agreements, the Swedish legislature was acting on the 
assumption that an award with respect to which an exclusion agreement has been 
concluded would still be scrutinised at the place of enforcement, again assuming 
diat such enforcement would not take place in Sweden. In odier words, it was 
assumed diat an arbitral award would be subject to some sort of formal control in 
some jurisdiction. To the extent diat an award, which is covered by an exclusion 
agreement, is to be enforced in Sweden, section 51 stipulates that such an award 
will be recognised and enforced in Sweden on die basis of the requirements and 
conditions stipulated for foreign arbitral awards. It will, in odier words, be possible 
384 Arbitration International Volume 17 Number 4 
for the respondent in enforcement proceedings to rely on all the grounds 
enumerated in the New York Convention and in sections 53 to 60 of the Act. 
(v) Remission 
Under the old Act, a successful challenge under section 21 resulted in a court 
judgment setting aside the award in whole or in part. Issues dealt with in the award 
had therefore to be addressed anew in a subsequent and separate arbitration. 
Inspired by the UNCITRAL Model Law and by the more flexible approach taken, 
e.g. in England and Switzerland, the Act introduces a new remedy - remission - with 
a view to creating greater flexibility and speed. The remedy in question is regulated 
by section 35, which provides that a court may stay an action concerning the 
invalidity or setting aside of an award for a certain period of time, to provide the 
arbitrators with an opportunity to resume the arbitration proceedings, or to take 
other action which in the opinion of the arbitrators would eliminate the grounds for 
the invalidity or for the setting aside of the award, provided either (1) that the court 
has found the action to be substantiated and either of the parties has requested a 
stay, or (2) that both parties have requested a stay. 
This means that if both parties ask the court to stay the proceedings, the court 
must do so. On the other hand, if only one of the parties requests a stay, the court 
can grant this request only if it finds that the action to challenge the award is 
substantiated. In practice this means that, before the court can draw such a 
conclusion, it must usually hold a main hearing with the parties during which it will 
become clear to the court that the proceedings to have the award declared invalid 
or set aside will succeed. Alternatively, it may be obvious from the outset that the 
action to challenge the award is substantiated, and the Court may therefore grant a 
request to stay the proceedings without holding a main hearing. 
The purpose of section 35 is to give arbitrators the opportunity to remedy 
procedural defects which could have led to the setting aside of the award, or its 
being declared invalid. This presupposes that the procedural defect in question is 
of such a nature that it is possible to remedy. If one of the arbitrators is 
disqualified, for example, it will be of little use to remit the case to a tribunal of 
which that arbitrator is a member. On the other hand, if the procedural defect is 
such that it could be remedied, e.g. by hearing a witness, the arbitrators would be 
expected to take such action. This would happen only on the basis of the further 
assumption that the arbitrators are willing to do so. It is not clear that arbitrators 
have a duty to participate in new arbitral proceedings, the sole objective of which 
would be to remedy procedural defects. 
If the arbitrators do render a new award, a party may wimin such period of time 
as determined by the court, and without filing a new complaint, challenge the new 
award in so far as such complaint is based on the resumed arbitration proceedings, 
or on amendments made to the first award. 
Even though it is possible to foresee a number of procedural complications in 
die application of section 35, one must always keep the alternative in mind, i.e. the 
setting aside of the award, or having it declared invalid. This new provision means 
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that it may be possible to prevent such dramatic consequences in situations where 
a procedural defect can be remedied by arbitrators. 
(b) Enforceability of Arbitral Awards 
In discussing the enforceability of arbitral awards, there are diree distinctions to be 
made: (i) enforcement abroad of Swedish arbitral awards, (ii) enforcement of 
foreign arbitral awards in Sweden and (iii) enforcement of Swedish awards in 
Sweden. 
The three situations are addressed in turn infra. 
(i) Enforcement abroad of Swedish awards 
Enforcing Swedish arbitral awards abroad is of course a matter entirely for the laws 
of die enforcing state. Since Sweden has ratified die New York Convention 
widiout any reservation or reciprocity requirements, which are available to 
members of the New York Convention, the Convention should as a rule not bar 
Swedish awards from being enforced abroad. In addition, if the award is rendered 
in Sweden the arbitration agreement would generally be regarded as a Swedish 
arbitration agreement and would be governed by Swedish law. Since Sweden has 
generous rules regarding die validity of arbitration agreements, an arbitral award 
rendered on the basis of such an agreement will rarely be refused enforcement by 
reason of invalidity of the agreement. 
(ii) Enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in Sweden 
The last chapter of the Act incorporates provisions which were previously found in 
the 1929 Act Concerning Foreign Arbitration Agreements and Awards (the 
'Foreign Arbitration Act'), which was the Swedish legislation introduced to 
implement the New York Convention. 
The opening section, section 53 of the Act, provides that an award which has 
been rendered abroad shall be considered a foreign award and that in applying the 
Act an award shall be considered to have been made in the state where die 
arbitration took place. In other words, under Swedish law, a territorial test is 
applied, which means that all awards rendered in a country other than Sweden are 
considered to be foreign and thus enforceable under the New York Convention 
and the corresponding Swedish legislation, i.e. sections 54 to 60 of the Act. It 
should also be noted that for present purposes it is immaterial under Swedish law 
which arbitration law, or which system of arbitration procedure, has been used in 
rendering the award. 
Sections 54 to 60 of the Act incorporate the relevant provisions of the New 
York Convention. In ratifying the New York Convention, Sweden did not exercise 
either the reciprocity reservation or the commercial nature reservation which were 
available to the signatories. Accordingly, foreign arbitral awards wherever outside 
Sweden they are rendered, and whemer of a commercial character or not, are 
enforceable in Sweden pursuant to the New York Convention. 
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The circumstances under which a foreign arbitral award will be refused 
recognition and enforcement are set out in sections 54 and 55 of the Act. These 
circumstances refer to form and procedure and to Swedish public policy, but not 
to questions of substance. Section 54 lists the five grounds, which mirror Article V 
of the New York Convention, upon which an objection to recognition and 
enforcement may be based. In accordance with the underlying philosophy of the 
New York Convention, the burden of establishing the existence of those grounds 
lies in each case on the party opposing recognition. The grounds mentioned in 
section 54 are the following: 
(1) invalidity of arbitration agreements; 
(2) violation of procedural due process; 
(3) terms of submission exceeded; 
(4) improper composition of the arbitral tribunal or improper arbitral 
procedure; and 
(5) arbitral award not binding. 
Section 54, by and large, corresponds to section 7 of the Foreign Arbitration 
Act. There are some minor amendments, however, which have been made with a 
view to bringing the language of the Act into closer conformity with the text of the 
New York Convention. Generally speaking, these changes and amendments are of 
purely stylistic and editorial nature. 
With respect to items 3 and 4 supra, however, it should be noted that one 
substantive change has been made. Under the Foreign Arbitration Act, there was a 
requirement that the arbitral award be ineffective in the state where it was given, or 
under whose law it was given, for the arbitral award to be refused recognition and 
enforcement in Sweden. This was a requirement which was not in conformity with 
the New York Convention and which in fact went further than the New York 
Convention. This additional requirement has now been deleted from the Act, so 
that section 54 corresponds to the relevant provision of the New York 
Convention. 
Section 55 of the Act mentions two further grounds on the basis of which 
recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards will be refused, i.e. that the 
award concerns a question which is not arbitrable under Swedish law, or that 
recognition and enforcement of the award would violate Swedish public policy. In 
fact, the arbitrability requirement is part of Swedish public policy; accordingly the 
first ground is simply an example of the second. In the rare cases when these two 
grounds may come into play, the courts will take notice thereof sua sponte. 
A new, and from a practical point of view, important provision is to be found in 
section 60 of the Act, which provides that the Svea Court of Appeal, which has 
exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards, may in cases where enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is 
sought, at the request of a party, impose interim security measures. Under the old 
Act such decisions could be taken only by the district courts, i.e. the courts of first 
instance. 
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(Hi) Enforcement of Swedish awards in Sweden 
If a party has obtained a Swedish award, which is not of a purely declaratory 
nature, but requires a party to take action in some way, the winning party may wish 
to enforce the award in Sweden. In such a case he will have to turn to the Swedish 
execution authority. Unlike a judgment of a Swedish court, an arbitral award is not 
immediately enforceable. The execution authority must make a summary check of 
the award prior to the execution thereof. When applying for such measures to the 
execution authority, the applicant must attach the original, or a certified copy, of 
the award as well as of the arbitration agreement. The activities of the execution 
authority are regulated by the 1981 Enforcement Procedure Code, as amended, 
which stipulates that the execution authority must check the award to make sure 
that it is not invalid under the Act. The execution authority will not request proof 
from the applicant unless specific circumstances require it. If the authority finds 
that there is reason to believe that the award is invalid, it will instruct the applicant 
to go to court and have the issue of validity decided there. 
The authority will not, however, decide whether or not the award may be set 
aside on the basis of section 34 of the Act, but will rather proceed to execution of 
the award. If an application to set aside an award or to have it declared invalid has 
been submitted to a court of law, the court in question will also rule on the 
question of execution of the award. 

